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The all-volunteer force is our greatest strategic asset, providing depth, versatility and unmatched experience to the Joint Force. We must continue to train, develop and retain adaptive leaders and maintain this combat-seasoned, all volunteer force of professionals. We will continue to adjust in order to prepare our leaders for more dynamic and complex future environments. Our leader development model is an adaptive, continuous and progressive process grounded in Army values.
-The Army 2012 Posture Statement The enduring question of how Army officers make the transition from tactical and operational to strategic leadership is rising again as our nation begins analyzing wartime performance, draws down military forces under budget constraints, and anticipates future requirements for the Army. The scholarly literature on strategic leadership is full of articles, books, and other text in relation to this topic. This work begins by defining how the Army defines strategic leadership and the skill sets required to perform those duties at this level. Furthermore, it is also important to explore how well the Army develops strategic leaders in order to negotiate the future complex, ill-structured challenges that our strategic leaders will face.
During the last twelve years of war, the U.S. military has observed civilian leadership orchestrating the return to duty of retired general officers because they felt there were no suitable active serving candidates. Most recently, in February 2012 the Obama administration nominated Lieutenant General (LTG) retired (Ret.) Douglas Lute as a leading candidate to serve as the commander of the National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). White house officials praised LTG Lute's decorated military record and his experience in advising two different presidents from two different parties on two different wars -serving more than five years at the heart of policy deliberations in the National Security Council (NSC) in difficult national debates. 2 During his tenure as secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld also orchestrated the return to duty of retired Army General (GEN) Peter Schoomaker to become the Army Chief of Staff when he felt there were no suitable candidates who possessed the appropriate mix of military tactical operations and pentagon experience. 3 Even during Defense Secretary Robert Gates tenure, we observed events where he fired, replaced or requested the resignation of several general officers. 4 What can be learned about why these successful senior leaders lose their jobs?
Lieutenant General (LTG) James M. Dubik wrote that "making the transition to strategic leadership is a multi-faceted and, in a larger sense, lifelong and continual process that cannot be reduced to a simple formula." 5 He goes on to say, "Those who try to reduce to a simple formula what it takes to be a strategic leader or to develop someone to become one simply do not understand the complexity of the phenomena with which they are dealing. Some can make the transition, others cannot. Even among those who do make the transition successfully, capacity varies." 6 Framing the Environment
The time is ripe, therefore, to ask some fundamental questions about the process the Army uses to develop agile, adaptive strategic leaders in times when our Army is in transition. As the United States (U.S.) continues its drawdown efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that the coming decade will be a vital period of transition for the U.S. Army. As depicted in Figure 1 below, this transition is enabled by declining budgets, a shift in emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region, and a broadening of focus from 3 counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and training of partners, to shaping the strategic environment, preventing the outbreak of dangerous regional conflicts, and improving the army's readiness to respond in force to a range of complex contingencies worldwide. In order to meet the challenges of shaping a future volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) strategic environment, senior leaders must identify and develop agile, adaptive strategic leaders who are equipped to embrace and negotiate challenges that await them (see Figure 1 ). Army that learns, Soldiers come to recognize their common stake in the future of the Army's system and the things they can learn from one another.
Although at certain levels, leadership development is a part of the Army's training efforts and future armed conflict will remain in the realm of uncertainty; therefore it is important that our Army has systems embedded throughout ones career that develop leadership skills and attributes at the strategic level. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (1986), two of the scholarly giants in the field of America's first battles, suggest that a "thorough knowledge of war…increases the competence-and thus the self-confidence-of the military leader." 11 One of the most powerful statements that
Heller and Stofft posit on leadership is that "because there is no time to study, pause, and reflect on the contemporary battlefield, these activities must be completed in advance. The intellectual preparation of the military leader has never been more important." 12 Obviously, reality is more complex when addressing the issue of how the Army invests in developing strategic leaders of the future. General Martin E. Dempsey addressed the leadership issue as "job number one…It should be clear to all after more than nine years of conflict that the development of adaptive leaders who are 6 comfortable operating in ambiguity and complexity will increasingly be our competitive advantage against threats to our nation…Thus we've undertaken a series of substantive adaptations to rebalance the three pillars of leader development-training, education and experiences-and have proposed several personnel policy changes to make it clear that we are elevating the importance of our leader development programs." 13 Before approaching the challenge of developing strategic leaders in an uncertain environment, strategic assumptions must be identified.
Strategic Assumptions for Developing Strategic Leaders
By any objective measure, when you take into account the full range of U.S.
political-military activities on a global scale, the bar for the Army has been raised dramatically. Bob Johansen (2009), scholar, who has helped organizations around the world prepare for and shape the future, provides sound assumptions to assist the Army in its campaign in developing strategic leaders to meet the challenges of the future. Mr.
Johansen posits that "leaders with the right set of skills and appropriate expectations will need to make the links and organize people for action." 14 Mr. Johansen also provides three overarching assumptions that are linked toward shaping and developing the requisite skill sets for strategic leaders of the future:
 The world of Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA) will get worse in the future. Solvable problems will still abound, but top leaders will deal mostly with dilemmas which have no solutions, yet leaders will have to make decisions anyway.
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 The VUCA world will have both danger and opportunity. Leaders will be buffeted, but they need not allow themselves to be overwhelmed, depressed, or immobilized.
 Leaders must learn new skills in order to make a better future. Traditional leadership practices will be called into question by startling forces and events.
Cutting through chaos with these new skills, leaders will be able to make the future. Without them, they will be groping in the dark. 
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The safest prediction is change; the Army can no longer prepare strategic leaders to fit in the world of twenty years ago because that world will no longer exist.
Arguably, with the pace of change accelerating, the Army has little choice but to create a culture that is dedicated to lifelong-learning and commits its resources to its institutions that must shape the development of its strategic leaders. That's not to say that over the past 10 years the Army wasn't learning-far from it. In fact, over the past 10 years of persistent conflict the Army has shown itself to learn and adapt to the leadership lessons it has learned. The current Army's posture on developing institutions that develop strategic leaders may or may not resemble the institutions as they stand today. Self interests will not be enough for Army strategic leaders to negotiate the obstacles set forth by the future volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA)
world that awaits them. The Army and our great nation will need agile, adaptive strategic leaders who have broadened their concept of self to include the larger systems of which they are apart-Domestic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) elements the United States' national power.
Seizing the Initiative
In short, the Army has an opportunity now to refocus its efforts in transforming its learning and personnel institution apparatus' in order to improve how it develops agile, adaptive strategic leaders for Army 2020 and beyond. Therefore, GEN Abram's opportunity to develop a more diverse, well-balanced pool of strategic leaders was missed.
Although it may have been desirable to maintain traditional Army practices in training, personnel, organization, equipment, and leader development, it was difficult for GEN Abrams, if not impossible, to achieve all or even most of these traditional practices simultaneously. Army transformation was inevitable and vital to US national security. officers who invented new weapon systems, of course, but we also needed agile, adaptive strategic leaders who would eventually serve our nation effectively at strategic levels.
General Gordon R. Sullivan: Transforming an Army at War
Leading the Army toward Modularity
Ultimately, we are creating great leaders-impeccably schooled in the fundamentals but able to improvise to meet unpredictable circumstances…We have the best leader development system in the world because we are a learning organization, determined to grow and change to serve our nation…Our leader development programs will chart our course into the 21st century…I can state with confidence that, educated and inspired by our leader development effort, we will be ready today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow. Sullivan soon realized that the breadth of the reorganization he envisioned would require the participation not only of combat units, but also of those parts of the Army that generated and supported them. He instructed the vice chief of staff of the Army to oversee that work.
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Given the political and military situation in the post-Cold War world, moreover, the Army could probably never again expect to conduct major operations on its own.
Versatile enough to deploy for almost any mission, from humanitarian assistance to a major conventional war, its forces would have to be able to work effectively with the other American military services. Army command elements might also have to serve as combined headquarters with the militaries of other nations or coordinate with nongovernmental agencies. 44 The challenge that remained was scaling the Army to meet all possible requirements for ground troops in the post-Cold War world.
The TRADOC Pamphlet 535-5 stated that modularity, defined as adaptable standardization, would be an important characteristic of the future Army because the service would probably lack the scale of organization necessary to meet all possible requirements for ground troops in the post-Cold War world. The pamphlet cautioned that implementing modularity in the Force XXI Army would require fielding the sort of computerized information technologies that would allow fewer personnel to do as much or more than the larger staffs currently in place. The publication suggested that the division would remain the Army's main tactical formation but asserted that when necessary, modularity would allow a rapid, task-related configuration of a division and its support elements to do a specific job. 45 Training Guidance
The Training and Doctrine Command provided further guidance in a January 1995 pamphlet. The publication specified that modularity was, for the time being, a 22 concept that focused on echelons above division and on combat support units (such as engineers and signal elements that provided operational assistance to forces in a battle zone) and on combat service support units (such as ordnance and transportation that sustained fighting forces in theater at all levels of war).
The January 1995 pamphlet highlighted three sets of circumstances that seemed particularly important. The first was that the success of the idea itself would depend on the presence of effective information systems linked to reliable telecommunications.
This would ensure that all the units involved in an operation were reliably connected.
The second was that the new approach would require major changes in how the Army units. The gap between design and doctrine was especially troubling because the modular Army was radically different from the force it was to replace. 47 As a result, it depended heavily not only on traditional means such as firepower and mobility to achieve its ends, but also upon the acquisition, analysis, and transmission of computerized information. Recently, a respected colleague suggested to me that "we are developing the finest linebackers for our Army, but we also need to think about developing the best tight ends, wide receivers and quarterbacks." His comment was not intended to disparage the leaders we are developing today. In fact, there is general agreement that we are the finest and most capable fighting force because of the leaders we have in our ranks today. He was simply pointing out that tactical demands have in many ways trumped operational and strategic demands, and he was encouraging us to think about the future.
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Today the U.S. Army is the best trained, best equipped and best-lead combattested force in the world. Today's soldiers have achieved a level of professionalism, combat experience and civil and military expertise that is an invaluable national asset.
Our Nation has weathered difficult circumstances since the attacks on 9/11, yet we have met every challenge. The mission in Iraq has ended responsibly, continued progress in Leaner Army, 'The Strength of Our Army is Our Soldiers' is one of ten categories. 49 The drive to reform the Army is about doing things better, smarter and faster while taking advantage of available technology, knowledge and experience. The institutional Army-the part that trains, educates and supports Army forces worldwidewill become more flexible by improving our ability to quickly adapt to changing environments, missions and priorities. The Institutional Army is also working to rapidly address the demands placed on the organization by the current and future operational environments. 50 In order to meet these demands, the Army's focus on developing its leaders became top priority.
Leader Development
People are the Army, and the priority is to preserve the high-quality, all volunteer force-the essential element of the Army's strength. The challenge in the upcoming years is not just about attracting and selecting the best available candidates to be Army professionals. The Army must engage and develop our quality, combat experienced leaders so that we keep them, and they in turn, train the next generation of Army professionals. During the last decade of war, we have given our young leaders flexibility and authority to operate effectively on the battlefield, but the challenge is to prepare tomorrow by building on that investment and ensuring that opportunities for creativity, leadership and advancement exist throughout the Army. 51 In 2011, GEN Dempsey provided us keen insights on how the Army's legacy developed capable and prominent strategic leaders for 235 years but realized that tactical demands of fighting two wars had consumed us as a profession over the past decade. The Army's focus had naturally and correctly been oriented on winning the wars we were in. As the demand to support these wars is reduced, we need to be ready to add to the knowledge, skills and attributes of our brilliant tactical leaders and prepare them to operate at the strategic level. He went on to posit that "to preserve this great legacy, it is our obligation to "keep first things first" and ensure leader development remains our first and foremost priority." 52 What is more unique about GEN Dempsey's insight is that he understood the need for not only the development of leaders at the tactical and operational levels, but to focus more long term-the development of the Army's strategic leadership. Among this imperative, GEN Dempsey asserted that we must "prepare leaders for responsibility at the national level" and to develop leaders who are both accomplished leaders at the tactical level and competent and capable leaders at the operational and strategic level who will not only win today's wars, but also shape the future and win tomorrow's wars. 53 The Army Profession: Agile and Adaptive Leadership
The trends of the current operational environment forced GEN Dempsey to increase his emphasis on adaptation and building an Army profession that embraces a culture of change. As a result of this emphasis, he led a strategic campaign that focused on thinking differently about how to develop leaders, organize, train and equip Soldiers and their formations. On strategic leadership, GEN Dempsey provided some attributes 27 that future strategic leaders will need to possess in order to negotiate the demands of the future:
Strategic leaders must be inquisitive and open-minded. They must be able to think critically and be capable of developing creative solutions to complex problems. They must be historically minded; that is, they must be able to see and articulate issues in historical context. Possessed of a strong personal and professional ethic, strategic leaders must be able to navigate successfully in ethical "gray zones," where absolutes may be elusive. Similarly, they must be comfortable with ambiguity and able to provide advice and make decisions with less, not more, information. While all leaders need these qualities, the complexity of problems will increase over the course of an officer's career and require strategic leaders to develop greater sophistication of thought. and civilian education as an investment and not a tax on the Army profession. Our opportunity to transform the way we invest in our officer corps is now! But that transformation won't start by just changing our policies and our learning institutions-it must first begin with our military senior leaders.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Army general officers must be agile enough to understand and adapt to their environment. They must be culturally astute and comfortable in ambiguous or complex environments, and be able to shape their environment through a combination of authority, influence and persuasion. When selecting our general officers, look for broadening experiences and education, but also look for officers who have demonstrated vision, energy, creativity, a willingness to take prudent risks, good communication and interpersonal skills. Look for officers who can and will seize, retain and exploit the initiative across the range of military operations. 62 Where We Are Now
Organizations work the way they work because of the ways that people work.
Army policies and rules did not create the challenges of effectively developing Army strategic leaders, nor will they eliminate them. The difficulties faced by Army PME are influenced by senior leader mental models and relationships in the Army's culture-at every level, from lieutenant to General in Army formations to the national political governing bodies that oversee military affairs. If the Army wants to improve our system of developing strategic leaders, before we change the rules we must first look to the ways that current senior leaders think and interact together. Otherwise, the new policies and Army initiatives will simply fade away, and the Army will revert, over time, to the way it was before. 
Investment in Human Capital
In the Chinese language, two characters represent the word "learning." The first character means "to study." It is composed of two parts: a symbol that means "to accumulate knowledge" is placed above a symbol for a child in a doorway.
The second character means "to practice constantly," and it shows a bird developing the ability to leave the nest. The upper symbol represents flying; the lower symbol, youth. For the Asian mind, learning is ongoing. "Study" and "practice constantly," together, suggest that learning should mean: "mastery of the way of selfimprovement." 65 The time is now to better invest in the Army's human capital-the Soldier. The Rigid Army Promotion System
The Army should start by overhauling the officer personnel management system to allow for greater specialization among the ranks in order to build the bench of strategic leadership (see Figure 5) . Assigning, evaluating, utilizing, and promoting colonels with an approach resembling that which is used with general officers acknowledges that as officers move into strategic positions, fine-tuned development is preferred over mass production techniques. With such an approach, brigade command is no longer the only path to general officer as dictated by current regulations. As a result, a larger, more diverse bench of strategically-oriented colonel is developed. 67 By reaching deeper into the officer corps below the general officer ranks to identify and develop strategic leaders, the Army will also engender a deeper commitment from colonels as they are developed and utilized differently from their experience in previous ranks.
68 Figure 5: 69 Accountability in the Promotion System
In a system in which senior officers select for promotion those like themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties. 70 The Secretary of the Army needs to be more involved in the system for selecting general officers as a means of oversight to avoid "group think" 71 The Army's civilian overseers, both the Pentagon and in the Congress, should be wary when the Army rejects suggested changes and defends current personnel policies on the grounds of fairness. This tends, in reality, to be code for placing the interests of officers and the institutional Army above the interests of the rank-and-file or of the nation as a whole. 73 Break the code and the Army will develop the adaptive, agile strategic leaders our nation needs in order to effectively lead large organizations and influence hundreds to thousands of people. Additionally, the Army will develop strategic
